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Introduction
With the explicit initiation of the economic reforms in 1991 India has adopted a new
development paradigm.  Instead of inward looking government-led development, India
is now seeking outward looking market-led development, and instead of remaining
what Anne Krueger called "a rent seeking society" (Krueger 1974), India has now
adopted the structural adjustment package designed by the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank to move towards a deregulated open economy to get
integrated with the global economy as a solution to its basic problems of low growth
and structural mass poverty. Development policies including industrial policy in India
in the post reform period have been formulated according to this paradigm.
There is considerable discussion in the literature regarding the role of the government
in general and in the industrial sector in particular under the new paradigm. On the one
hand it is argued that the government has no role to play except for providing essential
public goods as the costs of such interventions will be very high (Lal 1997, Tsai 1997),
while on the other hand it is felt that the government has a role to play (though not for
wholesale or inefficient intervention), particularly to improve the technical capabilities
of the sector (Lall 1994 and 1996). It is also argued that even in "the miracle
countries" on the basis of whose experience the new paradigm gets it empirical
support, the state has played a crucial role in directing and promoting industrial
development (Krugman 1994, Mommen 1996).
Here it will be argued that the issues in industrial policy are much more complex than
what is assumed under the neo-liberal paradigm when one studies the recent industrial
experiences of some of the industrially fast growing states/regions in South Asia in
general and India in particular. Based on the experiences of post-liberalisation
industrial development in one of the industrially fast growing states in India (Hirway
and Shah 1998), it will be shown that there are quite a few issues that call for a review
of the neo liberal development paradigm in the context of industrialisation in this
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The paper is divided into three sections. Section One discusses the theoretical context
of the new paradigm and its implications for state policy; Section Two deals with the
empirical study; while Section Three draws implications for the industrial policy and
the development paradigm based on the earlier discussions.
Theoretical Context of the Neo-liberal Paradigm
Historically speaking, development economics offered several theories to developing
economies in 1950s and 1960s the application of which was intended to enable them to
overcome the problems of low growth and high poverty. Briefly, prominent among
these were the theories of development presented by "the pioneers of development
economics" such as, Clark  (1957), Hirschman (1959), Lewis (1956), Nurkse (1953),
Myrdal (1968), Prebisch (1969), R.Rodan (1964),  Lebenstein (1963), Rostow (1960),
Singer (1966), and Tinbergen (1958). Though these theories differed considerably
within themselves, there were certain unmistakable commonalties: they all
recommended an inward looking development path with a leading governmental role in
growth process. As regards the industrial sector they recommended an ISI (import
substitution based industrialisation) policy that encouraged the promotion of
production of goods that substituted for imports, control of imports from outside and
relative neglect of exports. However, the overall outcomes of these strategies were not
encouraging in the sense that these developing economies which furthered this path did
not experience a consistent high growth or drastic reduction in their poverty levels.
These theories were therefore challenged in the 1970s and 1980s by what is now called
the counter-revolution in development economics ( Lal 1997, Bauer 1972, Little 1977
and Balassa 1982). The major attack of the counter revolution was on the key role of
the government  in development theories (The counter revolution viewed government
as ineffective in achieving objectives, counter productive with undesirable side effects
and excessively costly as well as a breeding place for immense corruption.)  and on the
neglect of the market which was seen as an efficient allocator of resources  at the
macro level and minimiser of production costs at the micro level. In other words, on
the one hand, the government failed to deliver the goods  particularly in trade and
industry, while on the other hand, the neglect of the market forces led to the neglect of
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The supporters of the counter revolution therefore predicted the collapse of the earlier
generation of theories and victory for the neo-liberal paradigm.  The latter  paradigm
views the state as "bungling, blundering and botching" and the market as an efficient
allocator of resources, provider of incentives and a vehicle of growth (Srinivasan 1994,
Auroi 1995, Singh 1994, Smith 1995, World Bank 1991, Amsden 1989, Hill 1996 ).
The role of the state under the new paradigm therefore  has to be mainly market
friendly -- to facilitate the functioning of the markets. That is, the state is expected to
manage a stable macro framework, ensure competitive markets, invest in human capital
and arrange safety nets for the poor and the weak. Vigorous competition in free
markets is expected to be the key to prevent the concentration and abuse of economic
power. (Srinivasan 1994)  In the field of industrial policy the new development
paradigm  recommends  export-led industrialisation (ELI) in the place of  import
substitution based industrialisation (ISI).  That is, instead of putting trade
barriers to protect domestic import substituting industries, it recommends  promotion
of  export- based  industries that would  lead to competitive efficiency in the exporting
industries on the one hand and  the pattern of  industrialisation based on comparative
advantages of the country  on the other  hand.
Several other theories of development have  been presented after and simultaneously
with the counter revolutionary  theories. The main ones among them are  neo-marxist
theories, the Basic Needs Approach, human capital and R&D theories, new
institutional economic theories, sustainable development theories and human
development approach.   None of these theories, however, has been sustained  for long
because each  is incomplete, or not useful as a policy tool, or too descriptive and less
analytical or it has  not proved acceptable  on ideological grounds.  Consequently, "at
the end of the eighties, the only group of theorists  that has managed to survive in the
sense of getting the support of the premier global institutions are the neo-liberal
adherents of the open market ideology" (Schuurman 1993) . This is the paradigm
which is accepted and recommended for the world economy and for national
economies as a solution to the ills of both, the developed as well as the developing
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Some of the relatively new  insights, achieved through empirical evidence, into the
process of  development that seem to have led to the wide-spread  rejection of  the
earlier state dependent view of development and to have promoted the neo-liberal
paradigm  can be listed as follows:
(a) Capital accumulation is not the key to economic development as was assumed by
the early growth theories, but it is human  capital  that is  crucial  to it.
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(b) Related to the first, social development need not wait for economic development,
and  in fact,  it  helps economic development.
(c) There is no significant trade off between the present and the future, that is, there is
no need to sacrifice today for a better tomorrow,
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(d) Growth need not lead to inequity, in fact, both equity and growth can be
complementary to each other.
(e)  Political freedom and civil rights which are conducive to the growth of a market
economy, need not be sacrificed for economic development as both can complement
each other.
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These insights have strengthened the faith in the liberal view of development, that is,
they reject the controlled strategy of development,  and also encourage the rejection of
the earlier theories of development.
Empirical Basis of the Paradigm
It is to be noted that the neo-liberal paradigm has been derived from neo-classical
economics  and dosed with neo-classical  political philosophy ( Lall 1996).  As argued
by Sanjaya Lall, the main elements of  this  paradigm are as follows:
  1.  Markets are basically efficient and the government is inefficient.
  2.  Resource allocation is optimised by agents responding to free markets.
  3. The best development policy is to remove all interventions in the functioning of
the free markets.
These elements, particularly the first one is  based on  empirical evidence, including
those of  the east Asian "miracle"countries and  are not necessarily a part of the neo-QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 6
classical theory as such. But does the empirical evidence including those of the miracle
countries support the above assumptions?
The discussion on this  in  the literature  is  divided  into two  broad  views. On the one
hand, neo-liberals consider the east Asian experience as a success story of neo-
liberalism. Though the role of the state is not denied in the success, it is seen as the
contribution to the  removal of obstacles to the functioning of the market in these
economies.  It is believed  that the East Asian economies were more successful than
others in terms of long run growth because they followed the prescriptions set forward
by  neo-liberal theory and neo-classical economics.  As J. Page puts it, in the view of
the neo-liberals,  growth is a natural property of capitalism and governments have an
important role in providing enterprises with those public goods and macro-economic
stability that firms need in order to be successful, but beyond that point  governments
should not involve themselves, except in the case of market failures (Page 1994).  The
World Bank's famous study on the Asian Miracle considers that the East Asian
experiences is a recognition of the importance of markets and incentives, and an
indication of the limits of the government interventions and of central planning  (World
Bank 1993).  It is also believed by the neo-liberals that the East Asian experiences
show that human capital is as important  (if not more) as physical capital  though  they
do not see any scope for governmental interventions in acquiring  technological
capabilities. As argued by Pan Long Tsai, no government in the developing world is
likely to be successful in this task when the international economic order is very
difficult  for these countries,  where intellectual property rights are protected and
protected trade blocks are emerging in the North. Tsai therefore believes that
governments in developing economies are not capable of accessing the right skills,
technologies and institutions for technological capabilities in these countries (Tsai
1997).  These governments therefore  should refrain from making any selective
interventions in the market for promoting industrial development.
On the other hand, there are others who believe that the East Asian countries do
indeed provide grounds for careful government policies to overcome market failures
(though not for wholesale and inefficient intervention ), particularly for acquiring
technical and related capabilities (Lall 1994 & 1996).  Lall, for example, argues veryQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 7
strongly that one can evolve a capability approach from these experiences, since they
indicate that the state has an important role to play to promote technical capabilities.
He also argues that these interventions need not necessarily be "functional", market-
friendly interventions, but they could  also be  "selective" in character, (though he
states that theoretically it is not always possible to distinguish between functional and
selective interventions) (Lall 1996 & 1997) so according to Lall, the East Asian
experiences do indicate that  there is  a need for  some state interventions to promote
the export-led,  market friendly  growth in  developing economies.
Andre Mommen has recently done a careful and critical re-assessment of the East
Asian "miracle" countries, (Mommen 1996). He argues that the mere adoption of the
ELI strategy along with predominance of private enterprise and efficient macro
economic management does not mean that countries are following the neo-liberal
paradigm.  This is an achievement that owes a lot to the coercive role of the state.  The
state intervened in a highly selective fashion using repression of interest rates, directed
credit, selective industrial aid, export promotion, selective prices and distorting
incentives to promote economic growth in these economies. In other words, it was the
state that provided decisive momentum in the successful process of industrialisation
(Mommen 1996).  In addition, the other factors that helped the rapid industrial growth
of these economies were geographical (proximity to Japan), historical  (successful land
reforms and in most cases sound agricultural growth), as well as the favourable global
environment (availability of global markets for the export products), (Mommen 1996).
It seems to us that the East Asian experiences do not support the neo-liberal paradigm
in its purest form.  The state had to intervene in several areas to promote and support
rapid industrial growth.  There is no denying, however, that  the success was rooted  in
the ELI strategy, the predominance of the private enterprise, the high investments in
human capital  and efficient management of the macro economy.
Another important assumption of the neo-liberal paradigm  concerns  corruption and
the  inefficiency of the government under state-led development. Is this assumption
valid empirically? It is argued that competitive markets tend to destroy the basis of  the
rent  seeking corruption of bureaucracy and politicians, and  that liberal systems,QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 8
particularly under democratic frameworks, tend to make the system more accountable
and transparent and to lower incentives for corruption.  However, it is also possible
that bureaucratic corruption may increase under liberalisation when there is less
responsibility and less political controls on the bureaucracy. The decentralisation of
economic powers may generate more incentives and more opportunities for
corruption.  In fact, studies in China, India and Latin America  in the post liberalisation
period show that there is an increase in the levels and intensity of corruption in these
countries after liberalisation. (White 1997, Harriss-White 1997, M H Khan 1997, W
Little 1997). As observed  by Barbara Harriss-White and Gordon White, it is no longer
correct to assume that in the long run corruption will die away due to some overall
systemic changes like economic liberalisation, political democracy or social
modernisation.  Though these changes  can have some positive impact on the reduction
of corruption, the crucial factors  are  the nature of the state, the character of markets,
and human agency. (Harriss-White and White 1997).  In short, the task of combating
corruption has its own autonomous status.
In other words, neither the assumption that the government is more corrupt under the
non-liberal   regime than in the neo-liberal regime  is  empirically validated, nor as  we
saw above, is  the proposition  that the market forces,  without any intervention of the
government,  led to the Asian miracle.
We can now turn to  examine the post liberalisation industrial growth in India  in order
to understand  its dynamics and to assess its implications for the role of the state in
industrial development  in the country.
The Case of India in the Post-liberalisation Period
With  the introduction of the economic reforms in 1991  Government of India  decided
or was forced to decide to shift to the ELI strategy of industrialisation  from the earlier
ISI strategy.  The declaration of a  new industrial policy was therefore an important
task for the government.  The government of India therefore declared its new industrial
policy incorporating the new norms of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation in
1991. (Government of India 1991)QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 9
The New Industrial Policy of the Government of India
The main objectives of this new industrial policy as laid down by the government are
as follows:
• To build on the gains already made in the industrial sector,
• To correct the distortions or weaknesses that may have crept in the old policy
• To maintain a sustained growth in  productivity  and gainful employment,
• To ensure utilisation of human resources,
• To attain international competitiveness in the industrial sector, and
• To transform India into a major partner and player in the world  trade arena.
The major instruments  of the new industrial policy primarily aimed at reducing the
barriers that were created in the name of protecting industries in the earlier period.
These were as follows:
 
• Reduction in industrial licensing
• Relaxation in industrial location policy,
• Encouragement to private sector initiatives in core industries (which were so far
reserved for the public sector)
• Allowing entry of large sector enterprises into  the SSI (small scale industrial
sector) sector under certain conditions,
Other sets of active policy instruments  relating to special incentives and concessions in
order to attract  investments  to the industrial sector  from  within India and outside.
These included sale tax exemptions and concessions, transport subsidies, capital
subsidies, and other incentives to foreign capital and technology, exporting units and
EOUs (export oriented units), to non-resident Indians and to the Indian corporate
sector for specific areas (mainly backward areas) and specific industries.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 10
In addition, the industrial policy also incorporated several promotional and
developmental activities in terms of infrastructural support,  the  setting up of growth
centres and industrial estates,  and the supply of information about projects and related
matters to potential industrialists  in India and abroad, (Government of India 1991) .
Thus the major policy instruments included (a) measures for deregulation, liberalisation
and privatisation for unleashing market forces; (b) incentives, concessions and
subsidies for potential producers and (c) promotional and developmental measures for
supporting and encouraging industrial activities.
Since industrial policy instruments  were  drastically liberalised and decentralised
(industry  is in the concurrent list of the Indian constitution implying that both, the
Central as well as the state governments can formulate industrial policy, but  state
policies have to be in line with the central policy)  several state governments were
encouraged to formulate their independent industrial policies to promote industrial
growth in their respective states.  These were essentially based on the central policy
framework,  deregulating the market further along with providing extra incentives and
concessions to attract industrial investments.  In fact, the competition for attracting
new industrial investments has been so stiff among some of the prominent states, such
as Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, West Bengal etc  that it has been virtually a race
among the states in offering incentives and concessions to new industries.
Consequently, the levels of incentives have gone up fairly high in several states.
Gujarat state which was already among the industrialised states in India  has emerged
as one of the winners.  In 1996-97  it attracted the highest  industrial investment in
large and medium industries among the major states in India (Government of Gujarat
1997). We have therefore selected Gujarat state for empirical  study of the post-reform
industrial growth in India.
Industrial Policy in Gujarat: As seen above, Government of Gujarat is one of the
few state governments to announce its own industrial policy after the reforms. In fact,
it announced three consecutive industrial policies for the periods, 1990-95, 1995-2000
and  2000 AD and Beyond respectively. According to the state government, "the newQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 11
climate has opened up new opportunities " for industrial growth and the state's
approach will be to take maximum advantage of this new climate, to emerge as  an
Indian  Tiger ( Indext(b) 1996)
All the industrial policy statements of the government of Gujarat aim at attracting new
investments to the state from the Indian corporate sector, non-resident Indians and
from outside firms. In order to understand the latest policy thrusts we discuss below
the  most recent  industrial policy announcement of the state, namely, the policy for
Gujarat: 2000 AD and Beyond.  The main objectives of the policy are as follows:
• Accelerated development of the backward areas of the state,
• Creation of large scale opportunities to absorb the swelling ranks of  the
unemployed,
• Increase in the total flow of investment to the industrial sector,
• Achieving sustainable development, and
• Encouraging entrepreneurship and developing technology to promote "swadeshi"
(nationalist ) spirit.
As in the case of the central government, the main policy instruments of the state
government are  deregulation and liberalisation of the different markets, incentives and
concessions to potential industrialists in India and abroad and promotional and
developmental work.  The focus of the policy, however, has been on incentives and
concessions and  on  promotional and developmental work .
To start with, the government has devised a generous package of incentives and
concessions that includes exemptions and concessions in turnover tax and sales tax  on
a whole range of goods , such as  raw materials, intermediary goods, packing
materials, processing materials, consumable goods, by-products, scrap and waste
materials. In addition, there is a transport subsidy and capital investment subsidy on a
large number of products.  These incentives are given at the block level with 128
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incentives. In other words, about 74 per cent of the area of the state is eligible for the
generous package of incentives.
Some industries, viz. electronics and  "thrust industries" which are mainly export
industries like gems and jewellery, garments, leather products, rubber, and agro
processing and food processing industries  are entitled to these benefits all over the
state. Also, Premier Units (industrial units having a project cost exceeding RS 5,000
m, i.e. about US$ 140m, are granted the status of Premier Units . There will be one
Premier Unit in each block) and  Prestigious Units (Prestigious Units are units  with
the project costs between RS 1,000m to Rs 2,000 m. in three categories of areas.
There can be any number of prestigious units in a block.) are entitled to these
concessions all over the state. In addition, there are special incentives for NRIs (non
resident Indians) that range  from cash subsidies, tax concessions, out of turn
allocation of sheds, power, and other infrastructure, to various types of escort services
like providing facilities to  the families and children of investors (Indext(b) 1996).
Realising that subsidies and concessions are not adequate to attract industries to the
state if the required infrastructure is not available, the state government has given a
high priority to the promotion of infrastructure in the state. The government has
recently  set up the Gujarat Infrastructure Development Board for formulating a long
term policy and an action plan for promoting infrastructure for rapid industrial growth.
The government has invited  the private sector to construct  roads, power plants, ports
and  jetties and to set up new growth centres and industrial estates to attract new
industries. In addition, the state government has also provided special concessions to
new industries in the acquisition of power, land, water and other infrastructural
support, and  has assured these supplies within a limited time.
The state government has also made special efforts to provide all the required
information to prospective industrialists and has used the media extensively for the
purpose. It has given huge advertisements (by hiring private advertising companies) in
Indian and outside media on the state policy and supports. The Indext (b) (Industrial
Extension Bureau) which was set up by the government in the eighties, has now
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To sum up,  the state government has been aggressive and has made determined
efforts to attract industrial investments particularly in medium and  large industries to
the state (Hirway and Shah 1998).
The New Pattern of Industrialisation in Gujarat
The new policy has given  rich dividends  in terms of attracting industrial investments
to the state, particularly in the large and medium industries (Table 1). Sanctioned
investments in the large and medium industries in the state during 1991-1997  were
worth  more than RS 1,700,000 m (approximately, US $ 48, 570 m ) one of the
highest among the major states in India. In terms of investment sanctioned per year the
increase was from RS 26,700 m ( US$ 760 m) between 1983-1990 to RS 319,260 m
(US$ 9,000 m between 1991-1997., which is a more than 12 times increase! The
number of the large and medium projects sanctioned  per year increased from 110 to
649 during the same period, and the number of  jobs  per year increased from 17,704
to 158,287.  The data indicate that new industries were more capital intensive than
previously.
The new industrial investments are likely to introduce a set of new characteristics in
the industrial scene in Gujarat:  (a) to start with , the new investment is likely to push
up the rate of industrial growth in the economy. As seen above, there has been  a
quantum jump in  committed industrial investment in the state with  the compound
average annual rate of growth  per year in the committed investments in large and
medium industries  jumping  from 10.4 % during the pre-reform period (1983-90) to
15.9% in the post-reform period (1991-1997);  (b) the location pattern of industries
has changed and is likely to change further with the coastal Saurashtra region
attracting 21 per cent  of the total investments compared to the 2 per cent.in the earlier
period (Table 2); (c)  the new investments are much more capital intensive than before,
particularly in Saurashtra and Kate regions (Table 3);
4 (d) the investment  proposed  is
focused on mineral based industries, particularly in Saurashtra and Kachchh, (e) there
is an export-orientation in the new investment;
5 and (f) the investments proposed  have
a  large proportion of capital allocated to pollution-prone industries.  Historically,QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 14
pollution-prone industries such as dyes & chemicals, drugs & pharmaceuticals, petro-
chemicals etc. have dominated the industrialisation of Gujarat. In the new environment
now there will be an addition of mineral based industries, (Table 5).
A Field  Case  Study  in  Saurashtra
The purpose of the paper as mentioned at the start is to examine the assumptions
behind and  the predictions of the new paradigm.  In order to study the likely impact of
this new investment, we selected the cement industry  in  coastal  Saurashtra.  The
reasons for selecting this industry were: (a) this is (and is going to be ) one of the
fastest growing industries in the region, (Table 4) and (b) there are some old cement
units in the region which enabled us to study the long term impact of the industry on
the region.
The reasons for the fast growth of the new investment in this industry in this region
can be listed as  (a) the availability of limestone (according to the department of mines
and minerals, the supply of limestone in the region is  "abundant") with a liberalised
policy for its use,  (b) the new liberal environment  with regard to the policies relating
to ports, jetties and exports,  (c) the proximity of the sea coast for  the easy
transportation of cement and (d) the incentives and facilities provided by the state
government.   These  factors are therefore, natural, market related and state related.
Our field study  examined the impact of selected cement units on the economy of
coastal Saurashtra region
Saurashtra Region In Gujarat: Before we discuss the results of the study, it is
necessary to know about the major features of the Gujarat economy and particularly of
the regional economy of Saurashtra.
As seen above, Gujarat is one of the relatively more industrialised states in India. The
economy of the state of Gujarat, however,  is peculiar in some ways. On the one hand,
it has a relatively high per capita income (4th rank among the major states in India),
diversified income sources (78 % of the state domestic product is from non-primary
sector against 66% for All-India ), diversified work force (40 % of the work force is inQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 15
the non-primary sector against 32% in All-India ) and relatively developed capital and
financial markets. On the other hand, it has unevenly distributed and degraded natural
resources. Stagnant (long term) agriculture with production  fluctuating  from year to
year  and wide and widening regional disparities of growth. The industrial growth in
the state, however has been above 7 % since the 80s, and it is expected to rise further
with the rising investments. On this count alone Gujarat would have got  NIC status. It
seems that the relatively high growth of the state, particularly since the eighties, is
originating largely from the secondary and tertiary sectors (Table 6).
The Saurashtra region which has experienced a very big jump in committed industrial
investments is primarily characterised by a high degree of environmental degradation:
The region receives about 600 mm of average annual rainfall (which is highly erratic
with a CV of 40 per cent) and has only about  5% of its area under forests thanks to
the degradation of the forests in the area during the last half a century. Since there has
been overdrawing of the ground water in the region, not only the water tables have
gone down but salinity has ingressed from the coastal side .The salinity ingress has
indeed acquired serious dimensions   in the region, and if not controlled, about 30 % of
the region is likely to be affected by excess salinity by 2001 AD. (Gujarat Ecology
Commission 1997) More than 80% of the blocks in the area are declared as drought
prone or desert areas., and about 95% of the villages are declared as No Source
Villages (villages without any dependable source of drinking water ), (Table 7).
The fragile ecology is also reflected in the non sustainability of agriculture in the
region: there has been a decline in the net sown area as well as in the cropping intensity
in the region between early eighties and early nineties. Also, there has been a decline in
the numerical strength of the milch animals between 1881 and 1992.  Though the
agriculture is fairly commercialised thanks to the enterprise of  farmers, it is not
sustainable as it is using up the ground water without adequate recharge.
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In short, the region is likely to reach a point of no return soon if adequate action is not
taken. The heavy dose of industrial investment in the region should be seen from this
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In order to examine the likely impact of the new investments in the region, we studied
the working of two well known cement plants, namely, Gujarat Ambuja Cement
Company, a relatively modern unit in technology and Saurashtra Cement Company, a
unit with a lower level technology, but trying to modernise. We also conducted a
primary survey of 401 households in  four villages (two selected nearby and two
distant villages) and organised focus group discussions in 11 villages to understand the
household level impact of the industry we examined the village level impact of the units
by analysing block and village level data on the land use. The units selected are
relatively old ones, set up in 1984 and in 1961 respectively (though they have
expanded and modernised in the recent years), which allowed us to study their long
term impact on the region (Hirway and Shah 1998).
Major Results Of The Study
The major results of the study are discussed below:
1. Employment Generation: The cement industry has generated new employment in
the region. As our household survey showed, the selected units employed about 23%
of the workers of the sample households.  Some of these workers were engaged on
their family farms (which they sold to industries) before they took up employment in
these units, while others were either underemployed, mostly in agriculture, or were
unemployed earlier.  The new employment has generally raised the income levels of
these households.
It has been estimated that production of 1 m tonne of cement, on an average, generates
direct employment for about 700-800 persons (including technical and professional
persons). If indirect employment is included, along with its long term impact, which
includes trading, transporting, services  as well as construction industry when the
cement is used, the employment generation goes up to  about 0.1 m persons (Pranav
Consultants 1996).  However, this impact goes down considerably if the cement is
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2. Land Acquisition and the Land Market: Cement factories need land for quarries,
for setting up the factory and jetty  and for township building for the staff. As per the
official policy, the industry is expected to give preference to government wastelands
for this purpose, and then go in for private lands, village grazing lands or forest lands.
The units studied, however did not follow this practice. The Gujarat Ambuja Cement
Company which is located in the Nagher region , one of the few green regions in
coastal Saurashtra, has acquired large farm lands from farmers under the Land
Acquisition Act  turning green agricultural lands into drab quarries. They have also
acquired forest land for quarries under the same act, and got hold of village common
lands  or village grazing lands for quarries and for the  township by bribing or giving
extra favours to the leaders of the village bodies.
7  Most of the villages which have sold
common land are left with much smaller territories for their animals.
The Saurashtra Cement Company which is located in an arid region has largely
acquired government waste lands and some village grazing lands. As in the case of
Gujarat Ambuja,  many of the villages that sold their common land to the Saurashtra
Cement Company, were left with much reduced land for grazing than what is required
as per the norms.
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The methods of acquiring land (particularly from farmers and village level bodies) have
been  highly dubious. Industrialists tried to pay  minimum prices by keeping the deals
secret, by using government pressure through the Land Acquisition Act or by
threatening the farmers, frequently through local government officials and local
politicians.
9 As a consequence, the land prices are determined largely by the bargaining
strengths of  two highly unequal parties, namely, the industrialist and the farmer. We
observed multiple prices for the same type of land in the same village during the same
period, with smaller farmers receiving low prices and relatively large farmers receiving
higher prices.
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Our study showed that most of the sellers who lost all their land and became landless
were small and marginal farmers belonging to low castes. They also received lower
prices for their land due to their low bargaining strength. The return received from the
sale  of their land could not provide them with any alternative  sustainable livelihood.
Rather, the income was used up either on some consumption - social functions,
medical or other needs, or on  paying old debts. Though each of these households was
was promised a job in the cement company, the job was either not given or was casual
intermittent work which was undependable. In other words, they lost their permanent
livelihood on the one hand and did not get any reliable employment on the other.
It should be noted, however, that those land holders who sold only a part  of  their
land, and did not become landless, were in a better position as they usually got a higher
price for their land and frequently a long term employment in the cement factory.
Most of these farmers were obviously better off and belonged to higher castes.
4. Environment and Pollution: We used the expertise of geologists and geo-
hydrologists as well as studies conducted by the agricultural college in Junagadh
University and other organisations in India to understand the impact of the quarrying
on the land and aquifers and the consequences of cement dust on vegetation and
animal life  in the region. Our study showed that the cement industry has adverse
externalities.
The Government of India has laid down detailed rules and regulations about the
quarrying of limestone and other raw materials in the country. These rules include
instructions like removing and storing top soil, rocks and other waste etc. before
quarrying, (to be put back after the quarry is used up), controlling dust and noise
pollution while quarrying, regenerating the used-up quarries systematically by water
recharging and plantation, and using surface quarrying as far as possible etc.
10 Our
study, however, showed that these rules were not followed by any of the selected
units. Gujarat Ambuja-used surface quarrying, but not fully. Since surface quarrying
machinery was expensive, Saurashtra Cement Company used blasting which created
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Gujarat Ambuja  has started some rural development work recently which includes
minor irrigation, social services etc.
As regards pollution control within the factory, we observed that Gujarat Ambuja
Cement Company more or less observed pollution control measures (In fact, the
company has received several awards from the central government for this). The
Saurashtra Cement Company was, however, far from satisfactory in this respect with
the result that there was a lot of cement dust flying within the factory premises. It was
argued by the company that the pollution controlling equipment raises the production
cost by about 8% to 9% which they can not afford. This neglect had obviously harmful
effects on the health of the workers.
11  Though it was difficult to establish a one to one
relationship between the occupational hazards and the health problems of temporary
workers in the selected units, the data with local medical doctors and discussions with
them suggested that there were serious health hazards for the workers, particularly in
the Saurashtra Cement Company. Our study also showed that the pollution in and
outside the factory had a negative impact on animal health and  vegetation in the
region.
12  Our household survey showed that a majority of miltch animal owners
complained about cement dust making fodder non-palatable. They also complained
that the cement dust reduced the productivity of crops by about 15% to 17%.  This
observation was supported by a scientific survey conducted by  Varshneya elsewhere
in India, (Varshneya 1997).
Discussions with scientists also revealed that the quarrying, particularly near to the sea
coast, frequently resulted in saline ingression. In other words, though limestone was
abundant in the region, it was necessary to control the sites of quarries.
In short, the cement industry has had some negative impact on the regional
environment. With the quantum jump in investment in this industry, the impact is likely
to acquire serious dimensions in the future.
5. Labour Market Operation: The two units, like other large/medium units in the
region, have adopted a strategy for acquiring labour.  These firms primarily employ
three categories of employees: (a) technical and professional persons, (b) productionQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 20
workers under the Wage Board 
13 and (c) "other workers" which includes quarry
workers, sweepers, and other unskilled workers. The first category of workers which
includes scientists, technicians, supervisors, managers, accountants etc are usually
from outside the district or outside the state. They are well protected under social
security and welfare measures and they receive high salaries. The second category of
workers whose terms of employment are determined by the government Wage Board
are skilled and semi skilled workers.  About  half of them are from outside, as their
skills are not always available  locally. They are "permanent workers", and receive fair
wages as well as some other benefits of social security. The third category of workers
which constitute about 55% to 60% of total employment is that of unskilled workers
coming from local and nearby villages. They are casual workers or contract workers.
They have no regular employment and they receive low wages without any social
protection, not even  health protection.
There is not much mobility across the three segments of the labour market in the short
run. And as no serious attempts are made to train local youths through technical
schools or polytechnics etc. to absorb them in higher level jobs in the factories, the
prospects for their integration with the core labour market are not very  bright.
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To sum up, our study shows that the units exploit the local non renewable resources of
the region without regenerating the ecology and without controlling the pollution
generated by the production process: they  exploit  the local land market to minimise
the cost of acquiring land, and  distort the already distorted labour market to minimise
labour costs. The units have remained alien to the region without establishing strong
developmental linkages with the local regional economy (except for generating
unskilled employment for locals and promoting some petty trade and services in the
region). It seems that the industry is moving towards using cheap local resources so as
to export the finished goods abroad without adequate benefit to the hinterland. This
neo-colonial industrial growth is clearly non-sustainable and it has  no capacity to take
the economy on a "high growth path ". In fact, it is a means of exploiting the region
rather than developing it. And this has been achieved through a state policy that has
not only encouraged  the market forces but has also pushed industries in the region
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It will not be out of place here to mention the work of local resistance groups who
have tried to organise people around the issue of the adverse impacts of the cement
industry. These groups have tried to (a) prevent the setting up of cement factories in
the green Nagher region, (b) protest against the adverse impact of the environment of
industries on the region, (c) take legal action against the forced purchase of land by
industries from small farmers and (d) demand the "sustainable development" of  the
region. Though some small successes have been achieved by these groups, they have
not been able to make any significant impact at the regional level or at the policy level
so far.  Also, these groups frequently lack information, and get emotionally carried
away by micro level incidents to demand things that can not be justified logically.
There is no doubt, however, that these movements have a potential of generating a
strong people's movement in the region (Hirway and Shah 1998).
Implications for Policy and for the Paradigm
The study has several implications for development and industrial policy as well as for
the new developmental paradigm.
Development  Strategy:  Can we leave the decision about the development path to
markets? Our study shows that unleashing market forces by liberalisation and private
industrialisation does not assure a desirable pattern of development. The current
developmental strategy calls for much more attention of policy makers.
For example, Gujarat state including the Saurashtra region a sustainable form of
development which prioritises agriculture and the environment (Mellor 1970 and
Adleman 1995). Since the environmental protection and ecological regeneration of the
region are not market friendly activities (as the  huge investments needed for the
purpose are not likely to  generate any significant direct returns to the  investor) these
cannot be left to the market. Preventing salinity ingress by large scale bunding on the
sea coast and undertaking large scale plantation  to prevent desertification from the
north  will need huge investments which will have to come from the government.
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not be possible without the intervention of the state as macro and meso watershed
development needs state intervention, even though micro watershed planning may be
left to private farmers.
An "Environment First and the Agriculture First" strategy would have long term
impacts on the course of development of the economy.  These strategies will tend to
make the development employment intensive and broad based, participative and
equitable.
The state, however has gone in for a dose of heavy industrialisation in the region
without worrying about the regional priorities.  Subsidising industrial growth in an
environmentally degraded region that is likely to degrade further is clearly a non-
sustainable proposition.  In other words, it is important that the development strategy
is designed in a sound fashion , with environment/agriculture first approach  as a sound
basis of development.
Secondly, questions are raised about the policy of the central and state  governments
of  promoting industrialisation in backward areas, mainly by providing extra incentives
to potential industrialists without concern for externalities.  Since this is a major plank
of governments in developing countries for promoting industrial development,  it needs
the more critical attention of policy makers.
Thirdly, this study also has general implications for the pattern of industrialisation in
India in the post liberalisation period. Theoretically there are two broad approaches to
industrialisation, namely, "textile first" and "machinery first" strategies. In the context
of Saurashtra the two alternatives are: to promote the already existing industrial
impulses which have grown autonomously, which are spread over several centres and
which consists of small scale units; or to promote large, capital-intensive, high-tech
industries which can contribute to exports and which use non renewable resources and
generate pollution that is not controlled adequately.  The Saurashtra region  had (and
has), in addition to the cement and other mineral based industries, several other
industries spread over industrial centres like Rajkot, Jamnagar, Morabi, Jetpur,
Bhavnagar, Than, Surendranagar etc. producing  diesel engines, small engineeringQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 23
products, textiles, garments, tile and pottery, watches and clocks etc. Were (are)  there
any strong grounds to push the second kind of industrialisation so hard in the region,
or was it more appropriate to promote the first kind of industrialisation by providing
the required infrastructural support ? An expert committee which was set up in 1989-
1990 to suggest measures to promote industrial growth in Saurashtra had clearly
recommended the first approach (Lakdawala 1994). The committee had recommended
expansion and diversification of the existing industrial impulses in the region by
undertaking large investments in infrastructure and other promotional measures. The
committee had also recommended an investment of RS 20,000 m in protecting the
regional environment and regenerating the ecology.
One can not deny the growth of the cement industry in the region  where limestone is
an abundant natural resource and when cement is an important input in the
development of infrastructure in the country.  In fact, at present the cement industry
can be considered as a core industry in India in the light of the fact that the country has
to improve its infrastructure drastically in the coming years.  The real issues, however,
are first whether the industry should be subsidised through special concessions and
incentives  without making it make compensating payments for the environmental
losses that it  creates, and second, whether this should be encouraged when half of its
production is likely to be for exports. While the industry should be allowed to grow, it
should be made to pay for the costs of the ecological regeneration that will be needed
because of its operation.
Environmental and Ecological Issues: Environmental issues do not figure in the neo-
liberal paradigm for the simple reason that it assumes that the resources are scarce but
do not create externalities. This is not only not true, but the issue of externalities is of
utmost importance to India, especially in Gujarat where environmental degradation has
acquired serious dimensions. Another major issue for industrial policy therefore
concerns environmental and ecological constraints on industrialisation. The study
shows that natural resources constrain on the pattern of development including
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According to the neo-liberal paradigm, prices of factors of production should reflect
their relative scarcity. Because of official policy regarding the use of mineral resources,
however, their prices are much lower than what they should be, with the result that
they are used much more freely than what the market forces by themselves would have
allowed.  When to this fact is added the neglect of  environmental laws, the
consequences may involve widespread environmental destruction. Environmental
aspects of industrialisation therefore ought to be routinely considered by planners.
To start with, natural resources place  restrictions on  location. In this case, cement
units should not be located in Nagher region (which is one of the few green regions
left) though the region has the required raw materials. Also, quarries should not be
located right on the seacoast as it may accelerate salinity ingress in the region.
The cement industry should pay for  environmental losses. As seen above,  industry
should be forced to install  equipment for pollution control, should be asked to use
surface quarrying equipment, and should be made responsible for the regeneration of
used quarries. In other words, instead of receiving special concessions it should pay
the market or state-regulated prices for the environmental losses for which  it has been
responsible.
Are the concerns for the environment a luxury that a poor country can not afford?  It is
frequently argued that a poor country should not bother about pollution etc. as long as
growth takes place and employment is generated for the unemployed. However, this
argument does not bear scrutiny when it is realised that the poor are the worst
sufferers of pollution.. In the light of the fact that there is a gradual shift of pollution-
prone industries to the third world countries, it is important to see that environmental
rules are enforced.
Intervention in the Land and Labour Markets: State interventions are needed both
in the land and labour markets if the industrial growth is to be integrated with the
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The land market in India is highly imperfect due to the lop-sided socio-economic
structure as well as the state controls and interventions in the land market. On the one
hand, the state has put  restrictions on the buying of land (for example, land can only
be purchased within 8-10 km around the buyer's residence) and selling of land (for
example, you cannot sell the land if it is given under some redistributive land reforms)
while on the other hand it uses the Land Acquisition Act to acquire land for "public
utility" which includes private industry. The 1984 amendment of the act, which allows
private  industries (as public utilities) to acquire land at the price determined by the
government forces farmers to sell the land at a low price. That is, the Act does not
allow landowners to earn the market price which goes up the moment the cement
industry enters the market. The government of Gujarat has removed some of the
restrictions on buying and selling of land in the post-liberalisation period to enable
industries to buy land when needed (Hirway and Shah 1998). However the Land
Acquisition Act is now implemented more intensively to help new industries. Since the
land transactions in the market by industries are secretive and exploitative, and the land
acquisition  under the Land Acquisition Act are at low prices, land owners and
particularly small farmers belonging to low castes get low returns from selling the land.
It is important therefore that the state government intervenes in the land market in a
different way to liberalise the market.
The state interventions are  needed in the "land market" to make it more efficient  so
that the owners receive undistorted prices  and the  right  signals are given about the
allocation of the land to various alternative uses. The steps that are needed in this case
are  (a) there should be transparency in land transactions for all to know the prices at
which  land is bought and sold in the region,  (b) legal procedures is followed for
acquiring village common lands and transparency should be practiced  in these
transactions so that these are not made in secrecy by the rich and the powerful and (c)
the Land Acquisition Act should not be misused to subsidise land purchase by
industrialists at the cost of  peasant farmers. If the land prices are going up in the
region due to industrial development, the benefits should accrue to all the land holders.
Removing legal obstacles to the operation of the land market is one thing, but
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owners is altogether another thing. The former helps the land market, while the latter
obstructs its operation.
In the same way, state intervention is needed to integrate the cement industry with the
local labour market. The role of the government here should be to promote education
and skill development in the region so as to allow local labour to take advantage of the
new employment generated. The private units are not much likely to undertake this job
as skilled labour is available from outside and the further segmentation of  the already
segmented local labour market so as to acquire cheap unskilled labour minimises
labour costs. In other words, the distortions in the labour market are not likely to be
corrected by "market forces" even though the demand for skilled labour is increasing.
It is accepted that  new employment generated in a labour surplus economy can not be
at high wages or with high terms of employment. Should the state intervene here?
Some minimum labour standards need to be observed at least to protect the health and
safety of workers. These could be with respect to minimum wages and minimum social
protection (occupational health and safety included). There is considerable literature on
the contents of a minimum package of social security that a country like India can
afford.  Without going into the details of this literature we will only mention that there
is an agreement about the inclusion of occupational health and safety in this package.
The Role of the State: Our empirical study suggests that the state still has to play an
important role in determining the development path in a country like India. Though the
neo-liberal development paradigm expects that the role of the state is to undertake
"market friendly" interventions so as to enable markets to operate efficiently, our study
suggests that the state may have to go beyond these limits to ensure that the
development is sustainable, participative and broad based. Our study shows that  there
is a need for the state to intervene (a) to correct the strategic course of  the
development (such as, determining the points of the environment and agriculture
strategic), (b) to take care of the environmental issues in industrial development, and
(c) for to correct the functioning of the factor markets so as to integrate them with  the
development process.  In short, as in the case of the East Asian countries , the state
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Amartya Sen divides the nature of state intervention in two categories, namely,
overactive state (excessive controls) and underactive state (intervening much less than
what is needed - for example in social development) (Sen 1997). But the states in India
in the post-liberalisation period seem to be over active in an altogether  different way!
They are offering excessive concessions and subsidies to attract industrial investment.
This new interpretation of the neo-liberal paradigm in India and perhaps in all the
developing countries competing stiffly for FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and for
the consumer markets in the developed world has distorted the factor markets leading
to negative impacts on the local economies.
The role of incentives in terms of subsidies and concessions for industrial growth, and
particularly for exports has been accepted as a part of the neo-liberal paradigm.
(Srinivasan 1994, World Bank 1993 and others ).  Theoretically speaking, incentives
also are distortions in the market and they could be tolerated in a market-friendly
paradigm only to the extent that they do not give wrong signals for the allocation of
resources. Our study shows that so-called "incentives" can create market
imperfections.  In short, like the state-led development paradigm earlier the neo-liberal
paradigm in the present global context forces developing economies to distort markets.
As far as the role of the state is concerned, it is important to remember that  the state
intervention is not only performed by the national government (central or the state
governments in the case of India). The local government is also important, particularly
in taking decisions and implementing decisions.  These governments tend to be more
accountable, more informed, more concerned and more participative in functioning
than higher levels of the state.  Though these governments develop gradually (during
the early  transition period these local bodies are likely to be dominated by the rich and
the powerful, and also are likely to be least accountable to the general public) and
acquire strength with the growth of people's organisations, their potential as a force to
make the government accountable and effective should not be undermined. With the
development of the decentralised democracy in South Asia and particularly India, it
will be necessary to give due importance to these governments.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 28
In the same way, it is necessary to recognise the role of people's organisations and
NGOs as means of making the government accountable and participative. Such
people's organisations are growing in many developing countries including India. They
can not be ignored as an insignificant force any more.  As we have seen above in the
case   of the cement industry in Saurashtra, they have started playing a small  role
already.
At the end of the 20th century the issue is not whether we are for or against a state
dependent view of development or a market-dependent view of development.  The
history of development economics shows that if the earlier development economists
can be accused of "theoretical curiosities", that is, perversions of standard economic
principles  based on mis-interpretations of observed facts ( Lal 1997), the economists
of the counter revolution also  can be accused of the same fault. They can also be
accused of  reading  the East Asian miracle wrongly.
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To conclude, the issues in industrial policy in South Asia present one more example of
the constraints not of the state but instead of the market; and the need for the state
interventions.  Though one can not reject the role of the market (as an efficient
allocator of resources), private enterprise (for competitive efficiency and incentives)
and the efficient management of the macro economy in promoting development, one
can not also undermine the role of the state in directing the path of (industrial)
development.
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1  The human capital theories and the R & D theories of the 1980s and early 1990s have postulated
that human capital as equally important for economic growth.
2 The thinking that the present generation has to sacrifice for the future generation is not considered
valid any more as it is realised that the economic productivity of the work force in the present depends
also on their health, education, nutrition and welfare status.  The choice is therefore inter temporal
balancing.
3  It was G. Myrdal who stated that the political and civil rights of  a  "soft state" hamper economic
growth in the early stages and therefore these rights must be controlled (Myrdal 1968). However
empirical evidence suggests that the countries with civil and political rights do not suffer from
famines as elected governments can not afford to allow the population to die. (Sen 1997a ). There is
also  no evidence that shows a  negative and causal relationship  between political/civil rights and
economic growth.
4 The statistics on sanctioned investments  show  that the average investment per sanctioned project in
Gujarat for the period 1991-96 was  RS 381 m.
5 About  80 % of the new investment was in  industries (at  t h e  two digit level of  classification )
which were exporting their products. In the case of the cement industry  the domestic market is not
growing fast .  Most cement units including the  selected units are planning to export around 50 % of
the production. (Hirway and Shah 1998)
6 Agricultural growth in Saurashtra in the 60s and 70s was good when the farmers used up the sweet
ground water regime of the coastal region and  other ground water resources in the region leading to
serious  depletion of ground water in the region. In spite of this, however,  even   today the agriculture
in Saurashtra is largely depending on ground water. This is clearly not sustainable as even today the
recharge is far from adequate.
7 Our village level study showed that the general method of acquiring village common lands is to offer
some lucrative contract for business to the local elite/ the village head man. He then helps in
acquiring the village land. He also helps in other matters.
8 The 10 villages that lost some of their common land to Gujarat Ambuja Cement Company now have
13 % to 69 % of the required common land as per the norms of the common lands (based on the
number of the milch animals in the village ). It should also be mentioned that not all villages haveQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 30
adequate common lands otherwise (Hirway and Shah  1998).
9 Our study showed that the selling prices of land in the same village in the same year varied widely,
from RS 21,000 per bigha to RS 100,000 per bigha in Vadnagar, one of our selected villages.
10  The   Government of Gujarat has formulated '  The Mineral Conservation and Development Rules,
1988'  based on such rules in advanced countries. These rules have laid down detailed procedures
about removing and utilisation of top soil, storage of over burden, waste rock etc., reclamation and
rehabilitation of used quarries, protection against ground vibrations, precaution against air pollution,
discharge of toxic liquids, precaution against noise, permissible limits and standards , restoration of
flora etc. There are rules regarding penalty and fines also. But these rules are not enforced seriously.
11   It will not be out if place to note here that another cement Company, namely, the Digvijay Cement
Company, was closed down for a few days under the order of the district collector  after the official
investigation was carried out regarding its adverse impact on health. However the company restarted
later on.
12  O ur  household survey showed  that a majority of milch animal owners complained that fodder
with cement dust in it was unpalatable to animals.  The loss of crop productivity due to cement dust
was estimated to be in the range of 15-17 per cent. This was the perception as well as the result of a
scientific survey conducted by Varshneya. Refer to Varshneya (1997), The Effect of Air Pollution on
Crop Plants, paper presented in the National Workshop on Impact of Air Pollution on Agriculture,
New Delhi, 1997
13 The cement industry is covered under the Wage Board that covers only the permanent production
workers of the industry. The Gujarat Ambuja Cement Company has about 430 technical and
professional employees, 290 wage board workers and about 1000 other casual, contractual and
temporary workers. The Saurashtra Cement Company has 260 technical and professional  employees,
200 wage board workers and about 700 other workers.
14 The two units ( both of which are large units ) have neither set up technical schools nor contacted
local schools for undertaking skill training programmes  nor made any other efforts to train local
youths in technical lines so as to use them later on. Recently, the Gujarat Infrastructure Development
Board , a government organisation, has undertaken a project to estimate the demand for various skills
in the industrial sector in the coming years.
15  While discussing "The Development Thinking at the Beginning of the 21st Century" Amartya Sen
presents two views of development, namely , the fierce process of development of blood, sweat andQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 31
tears (BLAST) and a friendly process of development of taking little help from others - markets and
public services - that is "getting by a little assistance" (GALA).  Sen favours GALA, the friendly
process of development  which according to him  is  neither a shift against a state dependent view of
development nor a move towards a market reliant view.  As he puts it, this should be seen as a
rejection of the  "blood, sweat and tears " view of development  in favour of "celebrating people's
agency and co-operation and the expansion of human freedom and capabilities." He considers  that
though the market as an institution fits well in this new thinking, it is in no way a rejection of state
intervention.  In the final analysis, he argues that the development is essentially a process of
expansion of peoples capabilities  and development strategy  should help people in getting these
capabilities.  (Sen 1997a and 1997b).QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 32
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Tables
Table 1
Industrial Investments: Sanctioned Projects in
Large and Medium Industries in Gujarat
1983-1990 and 1991-1996
                                                           During                             During
                                                        1983-1990                        1991-1996
Projects Sanctioned
      Total Number                              886                                   4423
      No per year                                  110.75                               649.25
Investment(RS m)
Total                                                  213,860                            1,701,169
 Inv per Year                                      26,722                                319,266
Employment
   Total No                                           141637                            843673
   Per Year                                           17,704                              158,287
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Indext(b), Government of Gujarat, Ahmedabad. (1996)QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 36
Table 2
Location of the Sanctioned Industrial Investment
In Large and Medium Industries








Projects           13.31 13.17
Investment   4.13   4.62
Employment 15.31 13.01
Saurashtra
Projects   6.99   9.66
Investment   2.15 21.20
Employment   7.94 15.81
Kachchh
Projects   6.98   1.04
Investment   0.48   4.65
Employment   4.47   1.75
Source: Indext(b), Government, Ahmedabad  (1996)QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 37
Table 3
Investment and Employment Per Project
1983-90 and 1991-1996
Region                                             1983-90                                        1991-1996
Central & south region
Investment per project (RS m ) 31.79 36.28
Employment per project             158.86             165.29
Investment per employment          00.200             00.219
(RS m)
North Gujarat
Investment per project (RS m)  7.48               13.95
Employment per project            183.80             178.94
Investment per employment         00.041             00.077
(Rs m )
Saurashtra
Investment per project (RS m)         7.44              87.25
Employment per project               181.61                                              296.58
Investment per employment         00.041                                              00.294
(RS m)
Kachchh
Investment per project                       1.69                                             177.02
Employment per project                103.98                                             303.52
Investment per employment          00.016                                             00.583
(RS m)
Source : Indext(B) Government of Gujarat, AhmedabadQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 38
Table 4
Growth of Cement Industry in India and Gujarat
Year Production (m tonnes ) Exports (m tonnes )
1960-61 7.97 nil
1980-81 20.91  (1.71) 0.003
1990-91 46.15  (4.27) 0.18
1994-95 62.35  (9.69) 2.28
Note: The figures in the brackets indicate production in Gujarat.  It is to be noted that after the
sanctioned projects are implemented, the production is likely to go upto 35.00 m tonnes
Source: Index(b), Government of Gujarat, Ahmedabad (1996)
Table 5.
Percentage share of major pollution prone industries in Gujarat
Sanctioned investments in major and medium industries ( 1983-1990 and 1991-1996 )
Industry group 1983-1990  1991-1996
Fuel and fertiliser 3.16 11.70
Chemical dyes and
drugs and pharmaceuticals 57.08 44.70
Mineral based 4.43 8.80
Source : Indext(b), Government of Gujarat, Ahmedabad (1996)QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS22 Page 39
Table 6
Sectoral Growth Rates in Gujarat
1960-61 to 1970-71 to  1980-81 to 1980-81 to
1970-71 1980-81 1990-91 1994-95
Primary sector 2.91 4.15 -2.60 0.01
(agriculture) 2.27 4.22 -3.9 0.006
Secondary sector 3.62 5.64 7.26 7.13
(manu ) 3.62 5.64 7.26 7.45
Tertiary sector 3.51 5.86 7.50 7.75
Gujarat-total 3.32 4.95 3.08 4.95
India 3.17 3.66 4.78 5.36
Source :National Income Statistics,  Central Statistical Organisation, Government of India
             New Delhi, 1995-96
Table 7
Some Environment-related Characteristics of Saurashtra
(1995-96)
District Av. Annual Area under Blocks under NoSource  % change in
rainfall (mm) forest (%) DPAP/DDP % villages (%) livestock
(1981-92)
Jamnagar 497.2 4.0 100 99.80 -4.7
Rajkot 621.2 3.1 84.61 98.92 -0.4
Surendrangr 507.0 4.7 100 98.30 -3.7
Bhavnagar 595.9 3.2 58.33 99.08 -13.6
Amreli 545.5 6.0 90.00 98.99 -6.3
Junagadh 881.1 18.9 46.67 94.10 -1.9
Gujarat                                            10.00                    53.78                  82.80
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Socio economic review, various issues, Directorate of Economics and Statistics.Gandhinagar.